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Abstract—Cloud users have little visibility into the perfor-
mance characteristics and utilization of the physical machines
underpinning the virtualized cloud resources they use. This uncer-
tainty forces users and researchers to reverse engineer the inner
workings of cloud systems in order to understand and optimize
the conditions their applications operate. At Massachusetts Open
Cloud (MOC), as a public cloud operator, we’d like to expose
the utilization of our physical infrastructure to stop this wasteful
effort. Mindful that such exposure can be used maliciously for
gaining insight into other users workloads, in this position paper
we argue for the need for an approach that balances openness
of the cloud overall with privacy for each tenant inside of it.
We believe that this approach can be instantiated via a novel
combination of several security and privacy technologies. We
discuss the potential benefits, implications of transparency for
cloud systems and users, and technical challenges/possibilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computation is rapidly migrating to the cloud due to
its economies of scale and excellent network connectivity.
Large companies operate thousands of VMs on the cloud [1];
government agencies, non-profit organizations, and research
institutions adopt cloud based IT solutions [2]–[4], while
advances in mobile and IoT solutions shift their computation
towards the cloud [5].
Application development in the cloud has different dynamics
compared to traditional practices. The freedom to choose the
size and type of instances that will operate applications brings
along the problem of identifying/selecting the best instances
for running the applications. Here, ‘best’ does not mean the
fastest or most powerful instance, but rather the one whose
specific configuration is best-suited for the intended application
at the lowest cost. Variability in cloud instance performances
due to external interferences (e.g., noisy neighbors), especially
in smaller sized cloud instances [6], [7], further complicate
this selection process.
Cloud application developers (e.g. Netflix) spend an enor-
mous amount of effort and money to develop and execute soft-
ware for instance benchmarking, monitoring, and performance
evaluation [8]. This software allows the prospective tenants to
select and operate the right set of cloud resources that will
optimize the performance-to-cost-ratio of their applications.
In order to aid cloud users in their endeavors to evaluate
cloud instances, cloud providers (e.g. Amazon CloudWatch [9])
and various monitoring companies (e.g. Datadog [10], Logic-
Monitor [11]) monitor and expose application-level resource
utilization and performance features. These systems can report
application interactions with various services (e.g. number of
EBS calls) and monitor performance based on user defined
application performance metrics via instrumenting user appli-
cations.
Instance selection may be performed by using rough generic
rules, by sampling and benchmarking on small scale test
cases and using that information for instance performance
prediction [12], or by all-out brute-force benchmarking on all
possible instance types to identify the best fitting options [8].
These solutions utilize the metrics collected from applications
in order to perform instance selection.
Unfortunately application-level performance metrics are
indirect: Problems such as noisy neighbors (e.g. a neighbor
causing many L2 cache misses), which are observed due to
shared usage of underlying physical resources, manifest in
the metrics after the problem impacts the performance of the
application.
a) Problem statement: Current level of information
provided by cloud vendors forces users to reverse engineer
physical resource utilization metrics, which is a misguided and
wasteful process. At Massachusetts Open Cloud, an academic
public cloud, we would like to be better merchants and
provide physical resource utilization measurements as a service
(potentially even free of charge to differentiate our services)
to our users.
The potential benefits of exposing physical resource utiliza-
tion are many-fold. For example, by exposing the number of
L2 cache misses on the physical host where a cloud instance
is running, we can enable better performance prediction for
cache sensitive applications and trigger problem prevention
mechanisms to “kick-in.” Similarly, exposing the “current
connectivity” of physical hosts to services in the cloud
(e.g. block storage solution) or to the outside world can be
significantly useful during instance selection. Beyond its value
to commercial application developers, publicly-accessible data
on cloud utilization also provides immense value to researchers.
First, for any experiment run on the cloud, utilization data can
provide context for the results and facilitate replication and
extension of the work. Second, utilization data can enable
researchers to study the operation of a datacenter itself.
Unfortunately, the same data that can provide value for cloud
tenants also have the potential to be exploited by malicious
entities to gain insight into other users’ workloads, reducing the
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security posture of the cloud by enabling hazardous activities
such as co-location and side-channel attacks. The problem at
hand is to come up with mechanisms that enables us to enjoy
the benefits of information release while mitigating the security
implications as much as possible.
b) Contributions: In this paper we discuss the potential
benefits and harms of releasing physical utilization data
of public clouds in a publicly-accessible form. Next, we
examine several technologies that address portions of the
tension between openness and security. We propose that these
technologies combine synergistically to cover each others’
limitations and therefore offer a compelling solution that
addresses the needs of cloud vendors and tenants alike. Finally,
we pose a list of questions that we’d like to discuss with the
PAIS community.
II. TRADEOFF: TRANSPARENCY VS SECURITY
We believe that increased transparency regarding cloud
utilization will reduce user costs and increase the viability
of using cloud services. Both of these features provide market
incentives for a cloud provider to offer utilization metrics
as a service. On the other hand, utilization data can expose
activities of tenants on the cloud. More specifically, aggregate
utilization data may be used to pinpoint a specific tenant
within the cloud. An ideal solution needs to resolve the tension
between transparency and user security favorably, maximizing
transparency while minimizing security risks to tenants.
Current cloud offerings do not investigate the trade-off
between transparency and security. They simply offer no
transparency and potentially maximum security. We dispute this
decision. Since the importance of both objectives are subjective,
we start our discussion by listing user classes that could benefit
from cloud transparency and user classes that could be harmed
by it.
A. Beneficiaries of Cloud Transparency
In this section, we distinguish between three distinct types
of users who can benefit from the exposition of cloud physical
resource utilization information in very different ways (see
Table I).
a) Current and future tenants: Physical utilization data
are of immense interest to tenants of the cloud. They know
the CPU, memory, disk, and network performance require-
ments of their application better than anybody else. Physical
utilization data can enable them to navigate the performance
unpredictability of instances allocated to them.
Currently, tenants spend extensive time and money on reverse
engineering efforts to ‘vet’ several virtualized resources and
gauge their relative value toward the target application. A cloud
provider who offers physical utilization as a service can free
prospective tenants from this burden and permit them to focus
on optimizing their own application rather than the operation
of the cloud overall.
b) Scientific researchers: Today, even though many re-
search studies are conducted using cloud resources, repeatability
of experiments conducted on the cloud are debatable. This
variability concern when conducting experiments on the cloud
forces researchers to repeat experiments many times incurring
higher cost. Still the analysis made in many scenarios can be
dependent on the state of the cloud at the assessment time (e.g.,
an experiment made on a busy working day or a working hour
may not match an experiment conducted over the weekend.)
Currently it is not possible to exactly say under what
conditions the experimental findings are gathered. If utilization
information associated with the physical resources used in
the experiments were available to researchers, these could be
reported along with the experimental parameters to shed light
to external effects that impact experimental observations.
c) Cloud designers and engineers: One can argue that
current “black-box” design of pubic clouds prevents cloud
system innovation to happen in places other than the few big
cloud vendors. Utilization data open up exciting opportunities
for researchers who study the design of a cloud itself. For
instance, utilization data can permit engineers to examine the
impacts of different load distributions on cooling systems at
scale without the expense of building a realistic datacenter and
cloud to ‘test’ theories.
B. Bearers of Potential Security Harms
Utilization data may be used to pinpoint a specific tenant
within the cloud. Hence under a more transparent cloud model,
current tenants have to bear the risks of identification. This
is a critical risk for two reasons. First, an attacker could
passively use this information to monitor the tenant’s use of
the cloud (e.g., for one company to examine the popularity of
a competitor). Second, an attacker can actively spawn a co-
located VM to invade the tenant’s privacy by, e.g., determining
the tenant’s software [13]–[15] or cryptographic keys [16]–[18].
Below, we detail several existing methods that an attacker
might be able to use to identify the tenant’s physical location
within the cloud.
a) Cache usage: Perhaps the most common category
of side-channel attacks on the cloud involves shared caches
between tenants on the same physical machine. Attacks of
this type permit an attacker to check whether a victim with
predictable behavior (e.g., running a known web server) appears
on a specific physical machine. More specifically, several
papers have demonstrated the viability of Prime+Probe and
Flush+Reload attacks on the cloud, whereby the attacker
manipulates the cache with her own user-space process and
then observes how her memory speeds are impacted by the
target tenant’s process [17]–[19].
So far, many of these methods have required active effort
by the attacker even to perform identification, much less to
extract data from the tenant afterward. Furthermore, several
countermeasures have been proposed that permit the tenant to
leverage the cache side-channel for her own defensive purposes
[20], [21]; at a high level, they have the tenant monitor the
Type of user Objective Pertinent metric
Current or future tenant Purchase/use instance with desirable performance Accuracy of provided data
Researcher using the cloud Denote conditions of cloud at time of experiment Reproducibility
Cloud researcher Obtain aggregate cloud system statistics Precision of analysis
Current tenant Prevent co-location attacks Probability of being pinpointed
TABLE I
CATEGORIES OF CLOUD CUSTOMERS. WE DISCUSS THE BENEFITS TO THE FIRST THREE CATEGORIES OF USERS IN SECTION II-A AND THE POTENTIAL
SECURITY CONCERNS TO THE FOURTH CATEGORY IN SECTION II-B.
cache herself to classify when its behavior is consistent with a
Prime+Probe or Flush+Reload attack.
Unfortunately, our plan to have the cloud publish physical
utilization (e.g. CPU, RAM) means that we have reduced the
attacker’s burden from an active role to a passive one: she
receives the actual cache patterns that the side channel attacks
attempt to extract! Furthermore, the defensive countermeasures
are rendered meaningless as well. As a result, we must design
a system that adequately protects tenants’ sensitive cache
information even while still providing the benefits described
in Section II-A.
b) Network usage: The tenant’s network utilization may
also be used to identify her. An attacker can influence the
network latency or bandwidth available to the target tenant and
observe the impact. For instance, imagine that the tenant uses
the cloud to run a web server. Then, the attacker can probe the
web server with a specific network flow and then fingerprint
the tenant based on which network trace demonstrates the same
pattern [19], [22], [23]. If the attacker is already co-resident on
the cloud, then she can verify the target’s presence by flooding
their shared link and observing a corresponding dip in the
target’s connectivity [24], [25].
Even with public network utilization data, the attacker still
requires some sort of active posture to conduct any of the
above attacks. But, this ‘active posture’ may be as simple as
making selective queries to a public-facing website. As a result,
in order to realize our vision, we must adequately obscure or
hide the tenant’s current network consumption so as to thwart
the attacks described above.
c) Differences over time: The attacks described above
share a common property: in principle, they can be executed
simply by providing utilization data at a single point in time.
However, our vision is even stronger than this: we wish to
update the utilization data periodically.
Differencing attacks [26] allow attackers to infer the location
of users based upon changes in utilization over time. They
operate by observing small changes between two similar
states, in order to disclose an individuals confidential data.
For example, if a single service changes behavior, while the
rest of the users continue to consume the same resources, an
adversary can observe the location of the change, essentially
locating the service. We note that these changes can occur
within the same machine or across physical machines on the
cloud.
III. A PATH FORWARD
In this section, we investigate methods to overcome the
tradeoff between openness and security.
A robust technique should allow the accurate monitoring of
cloud resources, while ensuring the security of the cloud users.
Concerning the latter, a secure approach must hide the location
of each user by protecting against (i) active attacks performed
by adversaries that are also tenants, and (ii) passive attacks
performed by adversaries observing the published statistics.
In the first part of this section, we investigate four security
technologies that individually provide some (but not all!) of
the necessary protections.
Then, we propose a path forward via a novel combination
of the four security-enhancing technologies. At its core,
our resolution to the openness-security tradeoff involves the
mismatch in time: attackers require information about the
location of a victim’s VM at the time of an attack, whereas
honest beneficiaries of cloud utilization data are primarily
concerned with the historical performance of a physical
machine independent of the people who happen to be present
on it at the moment. Ergo, published metrics can balance
between openness and security by providing a variable notion
of accuracy that provides accurate utilization in the past but
whose fidelity decays as time moves toward the present.
A. Existing Tools
In this section, we describe four technologies that provide
some protections for cloud tenants against identification attacks.
For each technology, we provide a brief description of its
operation, and then focus on its capabilities and weaknesses
at addressing our specific security needs.
First, Secure Cloud Scheduling (SCS) offers the promise
of thwarting active attacks on the cloud [27]. It places VMs
in a manner that is unpredictable to the adversary and that
reduces its probability of successfully completing a co-location
attack. Although it offers high performance, it only ensures
a weak form of security. In particular, its scheduling, while
adversarially-controlled, is static. Hence, if an adversary ever
manages to identify a target VM, she will know this information
indefinitely.
Second, Moving Target Defense (MTD) [28] leverages
continuous decision-making to benefit the defender. In the
cloud setting, MTD allows tenants to migrate their VMs to
new physical hosts within the cloud by means of a scheduler
that remains securely outside of the attacker’s view [29]. This
movement increases the attacker’s uncertainty and therefore
increases her overall attack cost. Additionally, it mitigates
the damage from prior revelations (overcoming SCS’s defect),
thereby reducing the attacker’s window of opportunity.
However, MTD has two drawbacks. First, the migration
of VMs is resource-intensive; if the cloud needs to perform
this often at the datacenter scale, the cloud’s overall efficiency
will deteriorate. Second, MTD is feckless against problems
that only require a passive adversary to exploit. Recall from
Section II-B that some previously-known attacks are susceptible
to passive adversaries; more importantly, the public availability
of utilization data transforms some active attacks into passive
ones. In these cases, MTD allows invasive attacks for as long
the user remains in the exposed location.
Third, Post-Compromise Security (PCS) [30] protects data
and software in the present even if secret key material was
compromised in the past. The dual to forward secrecy [31],
[32], PCS is the culmination of a long body of literature
into authenticated key exchange [33]–[36]. It is well-suited
for combination with MTD because it can restore security
guarantees against a tenant whose previous information has
been compromised. For this restoration to be possible, though,
the adversary must lack the information needed to compromise
the target in the present. So far, all of the technologies discussed
fail to provide a distinction between past and present.
Our fourth and final technology, Differential Privacy (DP)
[37], has the potential to create a separation in time. DP
protects against both active and passive attacks. It ensures
that the location of any user in the data is hidden when
computing statistics by perturbing them before publishing. The
perturbation reduces the accuracy of the published statistics,
but also obscures the presence of any user in the original data.
In addition to its purpose-built use to protect individual privacy,
DP has proved useful in anonymizing user location as well
[38], [39].
The principal concern pertaining to the application of DP
toward our setting is accuracy. Utilizing current DP solutions
for infinite streams of cloud utilization data would greatly
deteriorate the accuracy of the published statistics by protecting
the user whereabouts throughout time. In the initial works that
achieved DP’s privacy goals in the streaming setting [40], [41],
the accuracy of the output greatly deteriorates with the stream
size. Fan and Xiong [42] show how to publish accurate statistics
while satisfying differential privacy, i.e., obscuring the user
presence in the data throughout time, assuming a finite stream.
Cao et al. [43] also take into account temporal correlations
among different locations. On the other hand, Kellaris et al. [44]
assume an infinite scheme, but satisfies differential privacy for
any time window of a predefined finite size, i.e., the user
presence is solely protected within any time interval of fixed
length. This final solution offers a potential path forward for
us.
B. Symbiosis
We propose a combination of the four technologies described
above in order to strike the appropriate balance between
security, accuracy, and cost.
We begin by advocating for a datacenter-wide application
of MTD. In addition to its benefits for tenants in general, its
uncertainty specifically decouples location information in the
past vs. present.
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Fig. 1. A hypothetical CPU utilization graph showing both the real observations
(blue) that remain private and the perturbed observations (purple) that we
envision releasing publicly. Note that the noise envelope (green) that governs
the perturbations varies by time, simultaneously yielding accurate past data
for historical analysis and protection against location attacks in the present.
As long as the allocation of nodes within each migration
step follows SCS, the attacker is also stymied when trying
to execute a co-location attack based solely on side channels
available in the present. Next, we advocate that cloud tenants
employ PCS so as to ensure that any cryptographic material
that may have been compromised in the past is now irrelevant.
Essentially, by periodically applying MTD, we may release
statistics about the past to the public. On the other hand, the
more recent the statistics, the higher the probability that they
incorporate the current location of a user.
As such, we can employ DP in a ‘decaying’ manner to con-
ceal the current whereabouts of the user, while allowing more
accurate past. Figure 1 depicts the ‘envelope’ of uncertainty
provided by DP’s noise. We highlight the fact that the noise
varies over time so that uncertainty rises as one approaches
the present.
Combining DP and MTD introduces an inevitable but
acceptable trade-off between accuracy and cost. Deploying
MTD more frequently decreases the need for publishing
inaccurate statistics that satisfy DP; in other words, it permits
the ‘envelope’ of uncertainty to decay faster as one goes back
through time. However, MTD is resource-intensive, and DP
provides security protections for data released more recently.
Future work is needed here because none of the current DP
approaches can be combined as-is with the MTD, as they do
not take into account the probabilistic nature of the sensitive
user location.
As such, we identify the need for a new notion of privacy,
which (i) can be seamlessly combined with MTD, (ii) quantifies
the offered security against co-location attacks, and (iii) returns
useful monitoring statistics with bounded error. Towards this,
we plan on viewing MTD as a probabilistic game (similar to
[29]), and defining a new notion of privacy that offers provable
guarantees similar to DP, while protecting the locations of the
users between executions of the MTD.
IV. DISCUSSION TOPICS
While we espouse a specific vision, our intent in a workshop
format is to promote a general discussion of places in which
security technologies can enable the introduction of new (non-
security-related!) features that benefit cloud tenants. We believe
this is generally an under-tapped area that is ripe for further
discussion, which our presentation should promote. Thus, in
this section, we list some of the core open questions that are
integral to the continuation of this research.
Interest on cloud transparency: Is there sufficient interest in
the data we propose to make public, Would people be willing to
pay for more openness in cloud services, whether the benefits
can provide a market differentiator if a cloud vendor adopts
our vision but its competitors do not, and whether our strategy
is viable to implement if the requisite security concerns are
adequately addressed.
Other attack vectors: Our vision to increase the transparency
of cloud infrastructures introduces a new attack surface that can
be exploited in various ways. We discuss co-location attacks
and potential remedies using existing security technologies but
usage of released data can enable other attack vectors as well.
Whether the released data can enable other types of attacks is
a matter of discussion.
Additional foreseeable overheads: The particular solution
we proposed requires rather substantial changes to the behavior
of cloud vendors, who must adopt MTD at the datacenter scale,
and tenants, who must modify applications they host on the
cloud to absorb the side effects of proactive features of the
system. Whether there exists other foreseeable overheads is a
matter of discussion.
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